What shall we say then? Is there unrighteousness with God? God forbid.
All Commentaries on Romans 9:14 Go To Romans 9
Thomas Aquinas
AD 1274
After showing that by God's choice one is preferred to the other not from works but from the grace of the one calling [n. 748], the Apostle now inquires into the justice of this choice. First, he raises a question; secondly, he answers it [v. 14b; n. 768]; thirdly, he objects against the solution [v. 19; n. 786]. 766. First, therefore, he says: It has been stated that God chose one and rejected the other without any preceding merit. What shall we say then? Does this enable us to prove that there is injustice on God's part? It seems so. For it pertains to justice that things be dispensed equally to equals. But when differences arising from merit are removed, men are equal. Therefore, if without consideration of merits God dispensed unequally by choosing one and rejecting the other, it seems that there is injustice to Him; contrary to what is said in Dt (32:4) 378 "God is faithful and without any iniquity"; "Righteous art thou, O Lord, and right are thy judgments" (Ps 119:137). 767. It should be noted that Origen fell into error trying to solve this objection. For he says in his Periarchon that from the beginning God made only spiritual creatures and all were equal, lest he be charged with injustice for any inequality; later, differences among these creatures arose from differences of merit. For some of those spiritual creatures were turned to God by love, some more and some less; on this basis the various orders of angels were distinguished. Others turned from God, some more and some less; on this basis they were bound to bodies, either noble or lowly; some to heavenly bodies, some to bodies of demons, some to bodies of men. Accordingly, the reason or making and distinguishing bodily creatures is the sin of spiritual creatures. But this is against what is said in Gen (1:31): "God saw everything which he had made, and it was very good," which gives us to understand that goodness was the cause of producing bodily creatures, as Augustine says in The City of God (c.11). 768. Therefore, we must set aside this opinion and see how the Apostle solves the problem when he says: Let it not be! In regard to this he does two things: first, he solves the problem with respect to choosing the saints; secondly, with respect to hating and rejecting the wicked [v. 17; n. 799]. In regard to the first he does two things: first, he proposes the scriptural text from which the solution comes; secondly, he draws the conclusion from it [v. 16; n. 775]. 379 769. The text he adduces is from Ex (33:19) where the Lord said to Moses: "I will be gracious to whom I will and I will be merciful to whom it shall please me." But the Apostle quotes it according to the Septuagint version saying: For the Lord says to Moses: 'I will have mercy on whom I have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I have compassion. The meaning is that all our blessings are ascribed to God's mercy, as it says in Is (63:7): "I will remember the tender mercies of the Lord, the praise of the Lord for all the things the Lord has bestowed upon us"; and in Lam (3:22): "The mercies of the Lord that we are not consumed; because his commiserations have not failed. 770. The text Paul cites is explained in two ways in a Goss, so that it solves the question and the objection in two ways. First, I will have mercy on whom I have mercy, i.e., on him who is worthy of mercy. To amplify this he repeats: I will have compassion on whom I have compassion, i.e., on whom I judge worthy of compassion, as it says in Ps 103 (v.13): "The Lord has compassion on them that fear him." It follows from this that although he imparts his blessings from mercy, he is nevertheless excused from injustice; for he gives to those who should be given and does not give to one who should not be given, according to the correctness of His judgment. 771. But having mercy on one who is worthy can be understood in two ways: in one way so that one is counted worthy of mercy on account of preexisting works in this life, though not in another life, as Origen supposed. This belongs to the Pelagian heresy which taught that God's grace is given to men according to their merits. But this cannot stand, because, as has been stated, the good merits themselves are from God and are the effects of predestination. 380 772. But there is another way in which one is considered worthy of mercy, not on account of merits preceding grace, but on account of merits subsequent to grace; for example, if God gives a person grace and He planned from eternity to give him that grace which He foresaw would be used well. According to this the Gloss is saying that He has mercy on him who should be given mercy. Hence he says: I will have mercy on whom I have mercy, i.e., by calling and bestowing grace, I will have mercy on him to whom I know beforehand that I will show mercy, knowing that he will be converted and abide with me. But it seems that not even this is a suitable explanation. For it is clear that nothing which is an effect of predestination can be taken as a reason for a predestination, even if it be taken as existing in God's foreknowledge, because the reason for a predestination is presupposed to the predestination, whereas the effect is included in it. But every benefit God bestows on a man for his salvation is an effect of predestination. Furthermore, God's benefits extend not only to the infusion of grace, by which a man is made righteous, but also to its use, just as in natural things God not only causes their forms but all the movements and activities of those forms, inasmuch as God is the source of all movement in such a way that when He ceases to act, no movement or activity proceeds from those forms. But sanctifying grace and the accompanying virtues in the soul are related to their use as a natural form is related to its activity. Hence, it is states in Is (26:12): "O Lord, thou hast wrought for us all our works." 773. Aristotle proves this in a particular way when he discusses the works of the human will. 381 For since man is open to opposites, say to sitting or not sitting, it must be resolved by something else. But this is done by deliberation, which is followed by choosing one over the other. But again, since man has the power to deliberate or not to deliberate, it will be necessary that something move him to deliberate. But since this does not proceed ad infinitum, there must be some external principal superior to man which moves him to deliberate—and this principle is none other than God. In this way, then, the very use of grace is from God. But this does not mean that sanctifying grace is superfluous, any more than natural forms are superfluous, even though God works in all, as it says in Wis (8:1): "Wisdom orders all things sweetly," because through their forms all things are inclined spontaneously, as it were, to that to which they are planned by God. Consequently, it is impossible that the merits which follow grace are the reason for showing mercy or for predestination; the only reason is God's will, according to which he mercifully delivers certain ones. For it is clear that distributive justice has its field in things given as due; for example, if some persons have earned wage, more should be given to those who have done more work. But it has no place in things given spontaneously and out of mercy; for example, if a person meets two beggars and gives one an alms, he is not unjust but merciful. Similarly, if a person has been offended equally by two people and he forgives one but not the other, he is merciful to the one, just to the other, but unjust to neither. For since all men are born subject to damnation on account of the sin of the first parent, those whom God delivers by His grace He delivers by His mercy alone; and so He is merciful to those whom He delivers, just to those whom He does not deliver, but unjust to none. 382 Thus, the Apostle solves the question with a text which ascribes all to divine mercy. 774. Yet it should be noted that God's mercy is viewed according to three aspects: first, according to predestination by which He proposed from all eternity to deliver certain ones: "The mercy of the Lord is from everlasting to everlasting" (Ps 103:17); secondly, according to His calling and justifying, by which He saves men in time: "He saved us in his mercy" (*** 3:5); thirdly, according to the bestowal of glory, when He frees from all misery: "Who crowns you with steadfast love and mercy" (Ps 103:4). Therefore, he says: I will have mercy, namely, by calling and justifying, on whom I have mercy by predestining and having compassion and finally by crowning with glory him on whom I have mercy by calling and justifying. This interpretation is more in keeping with the version before me: "I will be gracious to whom I will, and I will be merciful to whom it shall please me" where divine mercy is clearly ascribed not to merits but solely to the divine will. 775. Then (v. 16) he draws his conclusion from the authority he cited. This conclusion can be understood in a number of ways; in one say thus: So a man's salvation depends not on man's will or exertion, i.e., it is not owing to anyone through any willing of his own or any outward action; but on God's mercy, i.e., it proceeds from the sole mercy of God. What follows from the authority cited is found in Dr (9:4): "Do not say in your heart, 'It is because of my righteousness that the Lord has brought me into this land.'" 776. But it can be understood in another sense: all things proceed form God's mercy; so it depends not on man's will to will or exertion to exert oneself, but each 383 depends on God's mercy, as it says in 1 Cor (15:10): "it was not I but the grace of God which is with me," and in Jn (15:5): "Without me you can do nothing." 777. But if this is all that is understood in this word, since even grace without man's free judgment does not will or strive, he could have said the converse, namely, it does not depends on God's mercy but on man's will or exertion, which is offensive to pious ears. Consequently, something more must be understood from these words, if first place is to be given to God's grace. For an action is attributed more to the principal agent than to the secondary, as when we say that the hammer does not make the box but the carpenter by using the hammer. But man's will is moved to good by God, as it says above: "All who are led by the Spirit of God are sons of God" (Rom 8:14); therefore, an inward action of man is not to be attributed principally to man but to God: "It is God who of his good pleasure works in you both the will and the performance" (Phil 2:13). But if willing does not depend on the man willing or exertion on the man exerting himself, but on God moving man to this, it seems that man is not master of his own action, which pertains to freedom of will. But the answer is that God moves all things, but in diverse ways, inasmuch as each is moved in a manner befitting its nature. And so man is moved by God to will and to perform outwardly in a manner consistent with free will. Therefore, willing and performing depends on man as freely acting; but on God and not on man, as initial mover. 384 779. Then (v. 17) he solves the above problem as it refers to rejection of the wicked. First, he quotes an authority; secondly, he draws the conclusion (v. 18). 780. He says, therefore: It has been shown that there is no injustice, when God loves the just from all eternity. But neither is there injustice in rejecting the wicked from all eternity. For out of God's mouth the Scripture says, I have raised you up, or according to another rendition: "Have preserved you" for the very purpose of showing my power in you, so that my name may be proclaimed in all the earth. 781. The first point to notice here is what God does in regard to the rejected. He shows this when he says: For this purpose have I preserved you, i.e. you had deserved to die for the evils you had done: Those who do such things deserve to die" (Rom 1:32), but I did not call you to die at once; rather I preserved you in life for this purpose, namely, of showing my power in you. This interpretation can also be obtained from the version which reads: I have raised you up, i.e., although before me you deserved to be dead, I granted you life, as if I had raised you up. From this it appears that God works no injustice against the rejected, sine they deserved to be destroyed at once for their crimes; rather, the fact that He preserves their life proceeds from His exceeding goodness: "Correct me, O Lord, but yet with judgment; and not in thy fury, lest thou bring me to nothing" (Jer 10:24). Another interpretation is this, I have raised you up for sin, that you might become worse. This should not be understood as though God causes sin in man; rather, it should be understood in a permissive sense, namely, that from His just judgment he permits 385 some to fall into sin on account of previous sins, as it says above (1:28): "God gave them up to a base mind." But it seems to me that still more must be understood here, namely, that men are moved to good and to evil y God through an inward prompting. Hence, Augustine says in his book On Grace and Free Will that God works in men's hearts to incline their wills whithersoever He wills, either to good through His mercy or to evil according to their deserts. Thus, God is aid very often to tire p men to do good, as it says in Dan (13:45): "The Lord raised up the holy spirit of a young boy." He is also said to raise up others to do evil, as in Is (13:1): "I will stir up the Medes against them and with their arrows they shall kill the children." However, He stirs them to good and to evil in different ways: for he inclines men's wills to good directly as the author of these good deeds; but he is said to incline or stir up men to evil as an occasional cause, namely, inasmuch as God puts before a person, either in him or outside of him something which of itself is conducive to good but which through his own malice he uses for evil: "Do you not know that God's kindness is meant to lead you to repentance? But by your hard and impenitent heart you are storing up wrath for yourself on the day of wrath" (Rom 2:4-5) and "God gave his place for penance: and he abused it unto pride" (Jb 24:23). Similarly, as far as in him lies, God enlightens a man inwardly to good, say a king to defend the rights of his kingdom or to punish rebels. But he abuses this good impulse according to the malice of his heart. This is plain in Is (10:6) where it is said of Assyria: "Against a godless nation I send him and against the people of my wrath I command him to take spoil and seize plunder..." and further on: "But he does not so intend, and his mind 386 does not so think, but it is in his mind to destroy." That is the way it happened with Pharaoh, who, when he was prompted by God to defend his kingdom, abused this suggestion and practiced cruelty. 782. Secondly, there is need to consider the purpose behind God's doing certain things and permitting certain things. For one must remember that God works in creatures to manifest Himself, as it says in Rom (1:20): "His invisible nature has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made"; hence these promptings are ordained to this manifestation both for those present, for the very purpose of showing my power in you, "and Israel saw the great work which the Lord did against the Egyptians Ex (14:3), and for those absent, so that my name may be proclaimed in all the earth. Thus, it is clear that in this matter there in no injustice in God, because he uses his creature according to its merits for his glory. And it can be interpreted in the same sense if it be said I have raised you up, i.e., I have ordered your malice to my glory; for God orders the malice, but does not cause it. 783. Then (v. 18) he draws a conclusion from the two texts cited: from the text, I will have mercy on whom I have mercy, he concludes: Therefore he has mercy upon whomever he wills: "The Lord has mercy on them that fear him" (Ps 103:11); from the text, I have raised you up, he concludes, and he hardens the heart of whomever he wills: "You have hardened our heart, so that we fear thee not: (Is 3:17); "Some of them he blessed and exalted, and some of them hath he cursed and brought low" (Sir 33:12). There seems to be no difficulty about God's mercy, once we grant what has been said above. 387 784. But two difficulties seem to exist in regard to hardening: first, hardening of heart seems allied to sin, as it says in Sir (3:27): "A hard heart shall fear evil at the last." Consequently, if God hardens the heart, He is the author of a sin—contrary to what is said in Jas (1:13): "God is no tempter to evil." The answer is that God is not said to harden anyone directly, as though He causes their malice, but indirectly, inasmuch as man makes an occasion of sin out of things God does within or outside the man; and this God Himself permits. Hence, he is not said to harden as though by inserting malice, but by not affording grace. The second difficulty is that this hardening does not seem ascribable to the divine will, since it is written: "This is the will of God, your sanctification" (I Th 4:3) and "He desires all men to be saved" (1 Tim 2:4). The answer is that both mercy and justice imply a disposition of the will. Hence, just as mercy is attributed to the divine will, so also that which is just. Therefore, the interpretation is that he has mercy upon whomever he wills through His mercy and he hardens whomever he wills through His justice, because those whom He hardens deserve to be hardened by Him, as was stated above in chapter 1.
